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While John Dewey’s notion of inquiry is readily considered against thinkers like 
C. S. Peirce (Prawat, 1999), Hegel (Shook, 2000), and Immanuel Kant (Johnston, 
2006a), there have been few who have attempted to trace the Greek contours of 
his position. This is noteworthy, however, since:
More than one critic … has remarked that most of [his] significant commentary 
on ancient philosophy occurs within argument for some special phase of his 
own theory of inquiry. The indication … is that, in Dewey’s eyes, the study 
of Greek philosophy should not be thought of primarily as the occupation of 
a special academic task force, but as a continuing reinterpretation that is of 
general importance within contemporary philosophy. (Anderson, 1967, p. 86)
Those who have considered the connection between Dewey’s theory of inquiry 
and Greek thought have mostly situated their remarks within larger points, 
regarding either teaching and learning (Garrison, 1997; Johnston, 2006b; 
Cahn, 2007) or aesthetics and craft (Alexander, 1987; Hickman, 1990). The 
fact that this area remains somewhat underexplored could be chalked up to 
several factors: 1) Dewey was often quite critical of the classical tradition, 
particularly when it came to theories of knowledge; 2) Dewey was not a 
trained classicist, with little working knowledge of ancient Greek, and was 
self-admittedly not a historian of philosophy; and 3) whenever Dewey did turn 
positive attention toward ancient thought, he tended to speak in generalities, 
referring most often to “the Greeks” rather than any particular Greek thinker. 
In spite of this, there remain many compelling reasons to place Dewey’s views 
on inquiry in meaningful dialogue with the classical tradition. I will suggest 
that the most compelling of all is the link between Dewey’s view of inquiry 
and his particular brand of naturalism, which found its fullest expression late 
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in his career. This is an underappreciated connection in Dewey’s work on 
inquiry, either taking a backseat to the instrumental, experimental themes 
in his thought or misinterpreted as a form of positivism/scientism. Once 
acknowledged, however, this connection could help bring Dewey’s normative, 
socio-political writings in line with his theories on ontology, logic, and the 
acquisition of knowledge.
 Of course, Dewey’s theory of inquiry grew out of his rejection of the term 
“epistemology” and he worked his entire life to supplant it with more scien-
tific, embodied terms. His suspicion of epistemology, and the various terms it 
employed, stemmed mainly from his rejection of the dualisms of the Modern 
period, which he believed married the worst aspects of classical metaphysics to 
enlightenment subjectivism. On Dewey’s view, modern philosophy went wrong 
by attempting to:
… substitute an Idealism based on epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, 
for the Idealism based on the metaphysics of classic antiquity… Idealism ceased 
to be metaphysical and cosmic in order to become epistemological and personal 
… It tried, after all, to put the new wine in the old bottles. (Dewey, 1920, pp. 
49–51)
Such general accounts would appear elsewhere in Dewey’s writings and were 
often tied to his critique of the “spectator theory of knowledge,” which he 
seemed to trace from Kant back through the church fathers and eventually 
hung on the writings of Aristotle (MacPartland, 1945, pp. 291–3). This 
might explain why Dewey singled out Aristotle more often than Plato as a 
target for his polemics. Yet, as John Anton and F. M. Anderson have argued, 
even within Dewey’s more biting criticisms of the classical tradition, there 
remains an apparent admiration (Anton, 1965; Anderson, 1967). Though, 
whenever he wished to praise something in antiquity—especially anything 
Aristotelian—he tended to couch it in generic terms of “Greek” thought. 
Anderson even notes that, “To Dewey ‘Greek philosophy’ is, practically 
speaking, synonymous with ‘Athenian philosophy’: this in itself is a signif-
icant equation” (p. 87, n. 2).
 It is important to recognize that Dewey’s generic references to “the 
Greeks” should not be taken as a mere aversion towards praising Aristotle. 
In fact, Dewey made reference to the “Greeks” one and half times as often 
as he referenced “Plato” or “Aristotle” singularly–1246, 793, and 841, respec-
tively. Those numbers are represented by volume of his Collected Works as 
follows:
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As the graph in Figure 3.1 indicates, Dewey’s tendency to generalize about ancient 
philosophy also increased as he got older, except for the spike in 1908, when he 
and Tufts published the Ethics. The volumes of The Middle Works contain 510 
references to the “Greeks,” whereas The Later Works contain 651. References to 
“Plato” and “Aristotle” each drop slightly over that same duration (down 65 and 
20, respectively). This seems to suggest something about how Dewey viewed and 
employed the classical tradition, especially with regard to later developments in 
his thinking. I shall argue that reading Dewey’s later, deepened appreciation for 
Greek philosophy in general, alongside the development of his naturalistic theory 
of inquiry demonstrates how the various threads of Greek organicism at play in 
his thinking were undergoing constant adjustment and mutual refinement.
 Dewey’s general references to the “Greeks” should neither be seen as an 
indication of disinterest or unfamiliarity with the classical world nor as always a 
symptom of loose speaking. Rather, I believe he sought to recapture, sometimes 
unwittingly, something of the “spirit” of Greek thought, especially with regard to 
how it problematized human relationships with the natural world. As Anderson 
wrote:
Generally, when Dewey suggests that contemporary philosophers should do 
for modern culture what Greek philosophers did in their own time, or when 
Figure 3.1 Referencing trends in Dewey’s Collected Works (Source: Intelex Past 
Masters/Carbondale, SIU Press; Image source: chartgo.com)
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he speaks positively of Socrates, Plato or Aristotle, the emphasis is consist-
ently on the ideas of thought as telic process. With shifting stress and accent, 
Dewey points to the awareness of the social problem, to their concern for intel-
lectual criticism with a practical bearing, or even to the spirit of their queries. 
(Anderson, 1967, p. 98)
While Dewey may have shared with Plato particular concerns about education 
and with Aristotle certain commitments regarding method, it was the organic, 
inquisitive spirit that united them and other Greek philosophers with which 
Dewey most identified.
The organic spirit of Greek philosophy
What I am calling the organic spirit of Greek philosophy sprang up from the 
ground in the Greek city-states of Asia Minor during the fifth century b.c.e. 
where thinkers like Thales, Pythagoras, and Heraclitus began to speculate about 
physis. As George Herbert Mead put it, the origin of that speculation was largely 
determined:
… [B]y the physical character of their country. It broke them up into small 
communities largely situated upon the sea-coast with but slight possibility 
of spreading inland. The land itself except a few local ities was not capable of 
supporting a large population even from the standpoint of the relatively small 
communities that inhabited them. It followed that the natural increase in 
population flowed out almost con stantly except in later periods of Greek history 
over the sea in small contingents. (Cote, 2013, p. 390)
This social structure can be found in literature as far back as Homer and Hesiod. 
The earliest philosophers, therefore, would have been accustomed to viewing 
the world as a precarious one, in which change often occurred rapidly and 
violently. Consequently, their speculations centered on the interplay between 
stability and instability in the natural world and physis was a concept well suited 
to this aim.1 The early Greeks did not see nature as something antecedent and 
wholly separable from the human. Instead, the view that they shared, which 
did not sharply distinguish between the human and natural realms, could be 
called—following Werner Jaeger—an “organic point of view.” As he put it, the 
ancient Greeks in general, always had “an innate sense of the natural,” wherein:
The concept of “nature,” […] was without doubt produced by their peculiar 
mentality. Long before they conceived it, they had looked at the world with the 
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steady gaze that did not see any part of it as separate and cut off from the rest, 
but always as an element in a living whole, from which it derived its position 
and meaning. (Jaeger, 1986, p. xx)
This point of view filtered into every aspect of Greek life. Even philosophers 
who held a dualistic view of reality would not have drawn their distinctions 
along the lines of organic nature versus “inorganic” humanity. Regardless of 
how their speculations about change and permanence were worked out, the 
underlying assumption was always that human understanding was part and 
parcel of this larger picture, not separated from it.
 Over and above this “physical” continuity between the natural and human 
realms, early Greek philosophy is colored by a picture of the universe, the 
kosmos, as both alive and orderly:
The “Nature” of which the first philosophers tell us with confident dogmatism 
is from the first a metaphysical entity; not merely a natural element, but an 
element endowed with supernatural life and powers, a substance which is also 
Soul and God. It is that very living stuff out of which daemons, Gods, and souls 
had slowly gathered shape. It is that same continuum of homogeneous matter, 
charged with vital force, which had been the vehicle of magical sympathy, that 
now is put forward explicitly, with the confident tone of an obvious statement, 
as the substrate of all things and the source of their growth. (Cornford, 1957, 
p. 123)
The consequences of this view held deep implications for how human beings 
were thought to relate to the world around them—experientially, epistemically, 
and ethically—and became the core of philosophical considerations.
 Various strains of Greek organicism may be apparent in the writings of 
Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Aristotle, but it also loomed large in the thinking 
of figures traditionally considered to be more abstract, such as Pythagoras, 
Parmenides, and even Plato. As Huntington Cairns wrote in his “Introduction” 
to Plato: Complete Works:
Plato was the culmination of several centuries of Greek speculation and he 
took full advantage of the insight which his predecessors had developed. But 
speculation assumes intelligibility. The insight that the world is system, is 
organic, therefore both orderly and alive, is the Greek view as far back as we 
have records. Because of this previous work in philosophy he was able relatively 
early in life to see the world as an entirety and to grapple with its implications. 
The Greek organic view stressed a living entirety made up of members. (1961, 
p. xvii)
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However, since Plato’s theory of forms is most often read as an idealistic 
solution to the stability/instability problem, the organic features of his thought 
have often been ignored, aiding in the rise of the various dualisms of Western 
thought—appearance/reality, mind/body, fact/value, and subject/object—each 
built upon a sensualist view of experience not present in early Greek thought, 
perhaps not even in Aristotle, with whom it is often associated.2
 Besides speculating about a world which appeared quite unstable, these 
figures worked in a time of great cultural transition as well, in which an oral 
tradition was giving way to a written one. This required the repurposing of old 
terms to fit new concepts:
The Greece of 700 B.C., of Homer—and this was only two and a half centuries 
earlier—was completely non-literate; its early architecture, art, politics and 
poetry were the achievements of a people who could neither read nor write … 
the transition can be summed up as a shift from the poetic to the prosaic, as 
this occurred not in the vernacular, but in that part of the language selected for 
preservation. (Havelock, 1984, p. 70)
The word the early philosophers used to indicate the function of organizing 
the yields of sensory perception was one such word. Derived from an earlier, 
Homeric usage, empeiria is a combination of the prefix that meant “in” or “on” 
and a root that meant “to try” or “to attempt.” In this sense, “experience” for 
the Greeks meant that the trials of the sea could be read on the chapped hands 
and weathered faces of the sailors who had survived them. For them, there 
would arise no need to speak of erroneous experiences, in the sense of that 
which is abstracted “out of ” peiria, taking place within a mind, cut off from 
its surroundings. Instead, they spoke of empeiria as a middle state between 
perception on the one hand and knowledge on the other, but with a firm 
foothold in each. In this way, experience was, at once, in and of the world and, 
although it involved some measure of practical success, was not strictly identical 
with craft, or “technē” (Butler, 2003). Although Greek thinkers like Plato and 
Aristotle may have disagreed about the make-up of the world around them, 
one element common in their thought was that experience was a natural event, 
generated by that world. Simply put, experience for the organic-minded Greeks 
would be more like what is now called “life-experience.”
 Such a view of experience yields three insights regarding the acquisition of 
knowledge that might appear quite alien to contemporary epistemologists. First, 
since experience was related to some notion of practical success, knowledge 
would have to possess a deeply practical character, as well:
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The new effort to deal with abstractions seemed to require separate signifi-
cation, a terminology of what we might call pure intellection. Thinking and 
thought as a conceptual process was recognized as replacing, or at least as 
supplementing the activities of sensing, of noting, of looking at, of perceiving 
and feeling.3 (Havelock, 1984, p. 80)
This usage had two significant effects. One was that references to knowledge 
were colored by a newly coined reflexive grammar. Havelock explains, “In oral 
language the actions of agents commonly acted upon something; the subject 
did something to an object. But here was a new kind of action, namely sheer 
intellection, which perhaps was not an action at all” (Havelock, 1984, p. 81). 
The other was that knowledge was necessarily viewed as incomplete. Just as 
experience accreted over time, so too would knowledge. Second, under an 
organic understanding of empeiria, knowledge would likewise have to possess a 
decidedly non-propositional flavor. On such a view:
[A] sentence or proposition expresses how a thing is qualified (poion ti) rather 
than what it is (ti esti). The point is apparently that any statement I make, for 
example, about virtue, will only qualify virtue in one way or another by saying 
that it has this or that property. (Gonzalez, 1995, pp. 185–6)
In other words, to say anything about a particular object or concept would 
be, necessarily, to say something incomplete, which may be more or less 
useful, but which could never be confused with what the thing is, as such, 
completely. Last, the practical, incomplete, and non-propositional character-
istics of knowing imply that there is something of a process, or building up, 
toward robust knowledge from more inchoate cognitive states.4 In this way, 
intuition, creativity and deftness would be indispensable aspects of knowledge 
acquisition.
 Under such a view, thought and action could be said to “fit” together and 
“reinforce” one another. This becomes important when considering that, from 
the earliest accounts, the core of Greek moral life was aretē, or “excellence,” 
rather than piety. In order to fully appreciate the emphasis on skill implied by 
this concept, we English speakers may be better off using the term virtuosity 
rather than the usual translation of “virtue” when referring to the Greek moral 
ideal. To be an excellent person was to be a virtuoso, illustrated by the Homeric 
heroes Achilles and Odysseus. The aretē of each—the unparalleled physical 
prowess of Achilles and intellectual cunning of Odysseus—is what raised each 
above other mortals. This type of potency was later clearly tied to the intellect 
in Socrates’ famous dictum “to know the good is to do the good.” And, in 
9781472510556_txt_print.indd   53 13/02/2014   10:15
54 Dewey and the Ancients
Aristotle’s Ethics (Barnes, 1984), we are told that reason is grounded in human 
experience and that theoria and praxis are ultimately united in that most philo-
sophical of tasks—“thinking about thinking.”
 In summary, there appear to be a cluster of themes in Greek organicism 
relevant to Dewey’s theory of inquiry. First, it offered a picture of the natural 
world as functional and growth oriented. Second, it employed a conception 
of experience rooted in praxis and continuous with bio-physical processes. 
Third, it created a vocabulary of knowledge acquisition which extended from 
notions of “doing” instead of “seeing.” This distinction underscored three 
aspects of knowledge itself, namely its instrumentality (which entails reflexivity 
and incompleteness), its non-propositional elements, and its non-cognitive, 
intuitive origins. Finally, the praxeology delivered by Greek organicism focused 
on constructing and reconstructing habit through rational reflection with an 
aim toward better living.
Organicism and the development of Dewey’s naturalism
Before these themes are tied to Dewey’s naturalism and, more specifically, his 
theory of inquiry, it may be helpful to briefly trace how Greek organicism filtered 
down to him over the first few decades of his career. As a scholar who was 
neither trained as a classicist, nor primarily concerned with the history of ideas, 
it seems Dewey did not fully come to appreciate the Greek themes implicit in 
his work until well after he had joined the faculty at Columbia. As Walter Veazie 
recounts, Dewey’s self-assessment as a Greek revivalist came sometime during 
the academic year between 1915 and 1916. But the path Dewey took to such a 
realization was an indirect one and was a long time in the making (1961, p. 3).
 Going back to his graduate work at Johns Hopkins, Dewey was heavily influ-
enced by the neo-Hegelian G. S. Morris, who rejected the dialectic of Geist in 
favor of a more Aristotelian, biological description of the dynamism of nature, 
as well as C. S. Peirce, who, “by his own account emerged from the German 
fog primarily by the assistance of Aristotle” (Veazie, 1961, p. 4). Under Morris’s 
view, the traditional “subject” in epistemology was redefined as an organism, 
fully immersed in and interacting with a dynamic, organic environment. This 
move, which proved vital in Dewey’s later thought, came to Morris from his 
mentor Trendelenburg, who had been sharply influenced by Aristotle’s notions 
of potentiality and actuality and by Darwin’s theory of evolution (Boisvert, 
1988).5 On Trendelenberg’s reading, the notion of telos was rendered a type of 
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biological end in both nature and organisms. Morris, in turn, appropriated these 
ideas as he aimed at detailing the meaning of existence and the undermining of 
dualisms. Peirce also handed down a few concepts to Dewey, via Darwin, that 
were inspired by the Greeks. One was what Peirce called synechism, the idea 
that the cosmos consists in a continuous whole—with none of its part being 
fully separable, determined or determinate—increasingly growing together 
in complexity and connectedness. Since the universe, according to Peirce, 
could not be fully understood in terms of its constituent parts, he argued that 
synechism was an essential heuristic hypothesis to all scientific progress, and 
Dewey apparently absorbed the lesson, although he did not see the same impli-
cations as Peirce toward the question of the immortal soul. Another Peircean 
idea was tychism, which was the thesis that chance was a fundamental aspect of 
reality, and which Peirce believed directly followed from synechism. As he saw 
it, “our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum 
of uncertainty and of indeterminacy. Now the doctrine of continuity is that all 
things so swim in continua” (Peirce, 1931, p. 171). For Peirce, the combination 
of continuity and chance led directly to fallibilism, insofar as precision is impos-
sible when measuring the values of continuous quantities. Thus, the laws of 
nature are probabilistic rather than absolute. As Peirce would put it, the laws of 
nature express the tendencies or habits of things. From this, Peirce proposed an 
evolutionary cosmology, the upshot of which was: from irregularity, regularity 
emerges. This view, according to Peirce, could account for increasing complexity 
and diversity insofar as it always allowed for possible deviations and derivations 
from any established rule.
 These early experiences with Greek themes, albeit with a noticeable Darwinian 
slant, were reinforced at the University of Chicago, where Dewey worked 
closely with George Herbert Mead and Jane Addams, who both had intimate 
knowledge of classical thought and applied it to their work in social psychology 
and activism, respectively.6 By the time Dewey left Chicago for Columbia in 
1904, philosophical naturalism was already on the rise in America and many of 
those working on the articulation of the naturalist position found its roots in 
the Greek tradition. George Santayana’s five-volume treatise, The Life of Reason 
(1905–6), which claimed to be built on the legacy of Plato and Aristotle and 
aimed at showing, “everything ideal has a natural basis and everything natural 
an ideal development,” is a prime example (Santayana, 1905, p. 21).
 Dewey’s arrival at Columbia occurred two years after that of F. J. E. 
Woodbridge, who was known for his naturalistic reading of Aristotle, and one 
year after William Pepperell Montague, who was (along with Edwin Holt and 
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Ralph Barton Perry at Harvard) one of the leading proponents of the “new 
realism.” They were soon joined by Wendell T. Bush and the department at 
Columbia quickly moved to the forefront of the naturalism movement. Within 
a scholarly community of like-minded scholars, the naturalistic kernels of 
Dewey’s thinking could be nourished and would eventually produce fruits 
like Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), 
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), and a volume co-authored with Arthur 
Bentley, Knowing and the Known (1949).7 At the same time, the interest in 
Greek philosophy shown by the naturalists was diverging sharply from the 
scholarship being done both across the Atlantic and among classicists in the 
States. One example is Alfred North Whitehead’s Gifford lectures on process 
philosophy, which he called yet another effort in “a series of footnotes to Plato,” 
by which:
I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubt-
fully extracted from his writings … I mean that if we had to render Plato’s 
general point of view with the least changes made necessary by the intervening 
two thousand years of human experience … we should have to set about the 
construction of a philosophy of organism. (Whitehead, 1929, p. 39)
If nothing else, Dewey and the Columbia naturalists would have railed with 
Whitehead against a reading of Plato which rendered reality, as Whitehead put 
it elsewhere, into “two natures, [where] one is the conjecture and the other is the 
dream” (Whitehead, 1920, p. 30).
 Given these early encounters with Greek organicism, it should seem no 
stretch to say the commitments of Dewey’s naturalism were largely informed 
by a Greek spirit, especially in the account it offered of the sensual, volitional, 
and desirous aspects of knowledge acquisition, elements which Dewey clearly 
incorporated into his theory of inquiry. His theory was not strictly an epistemic 
one, but also reached down into his work in ontology, aesthetics, ethics, and 
political theory. There will not be enough space here to connect all of the dots 
between these areas, Dewey’s functional accounts of nature and experience, and 
the Greek notions of physis and empeiria. Fortunately, there is a raft of excellent 
scholarship regarding Dewey’s philosophy of experience which supports my 
reading of his theory of inquiry as embedded in his ontology and theory 
of experience (Alexander, 1987; Boisvert, 1988; Eldridge, 1998; Tiles, 1990; 
Hickman, 2001). Thus, I will limit my remaining comments to those aspects 
of Greek organicism which pertain directly to transitions from immediate 
experience to knowledge acquisition, trusting that it will be obvious how those 
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Greek aspects may be read back into what has already been written by others 
about Dewey’s theory of experience.
Knowledge as “doing”
Dewey insisted that investigations into any area of human understanding should 
always begin with the activity itself in order to get a grasp on its epistemic value, 
instead of starting from the imagined cause of such behaviors. Jim Garrison, for 
one, has emphasized this unique aspect of Dewey’s thought:
For Dewey scientific inquiry (thinking), was a process engaged in by some 
natural existences, including human beings … As Dewey saw it, we are partici-
pants in an unfinished universe rather than spectators of a finished universe. 
That is why our action, our behaviors, our social constructions, deconstruc-
tions, and reconstructions have ontological significance. (Garrison, 1994, p. 8)
The upshot of this was that while nature was in constant change, human beings 
could still act in their environment by testing their beliefs and adjusting them 
according to experience.
 Garrison finds the inroad to this feature of Dewey’s inquiry to be intuition. 
He argues that intuition for Dewey is a part of operative knowledge which helps 
turn an actual situation into a desirable one; “for Dewey all inquiry, not just 
moral inquiry, begins and ends with an affective intuition that involves a distinct 
feeling for the quality of a situation” (Garrison, 1997, p. 33). This belief can be 
read in many of Dewey’s essays, particularly two—“Affective Thought” (1926) and 
“Qualitative Thought” (1930)—but its foundations are located in an earlier paper, 
“The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896), which has been regarded as one 
of the most significant turning points in the research of human behavior. There, 
Dewey attacked the mechanistic view of stimulus and response that dominated 
the psychological research of the period and mimicked an older, erroneous 
mind–body dualism by placing stimulus in opposition to response. He wrote:
… [W]e still incline to interpret the latter [response] from our preconceived 
and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts and 
acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity, standing for the 
idea, is another thing, and the motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a 
third. As a result, the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a 
patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied processes. 
(Dewey, 1896, p. 97)
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In this regard, Dewey complained, the reflex arc was inaccurate because 
it placed the parts of an act prior to the whole. It failed to recognize that 
stimulus, movement, and response only made sense as an interpretation of 
an event after it had occurred; moreover, he claimed the notions of stimulus 
and response were non-existent entities that only gain meaning once placed 
in relation to one another. Even this early in his career, one can see Dewey’s 
preference for naturalistic accounts. Under his reformulation, the reflex 
arc does not run in a linear direction from stimulus, through response, 
to movement. Rather, multiple stimuli, responses, and movements arise 
simultaneously and are experienced, in chorus, as a singular, unbroken act, 
“which is as experienced no more mere sensation than it is mere motion,” 
and thus, when analysis dissects the reflex arc into separate states, “we have, 
only the serial steps in a co-ordination of acts” (Dewey, 1896, p. 106). Simply 
put, before an act can be divided into parts, its quality as a whole must be 
explicated.
 With this in mind, Dewey looked to give an account of inquiry that could 
present how it showed up within various functional conditions, or modes of 
experience. Those modes are, according to Dewey, natural conditions that 
determine how organisms would deal with the “instability” and “precari-
ousness” of experience. In his earliest text devoted to inquiry, Studies in Logical 
Theory (1903), Dewey set out on this project. There, he raised “important 
questions about the relations between dominantly aesthetic, moral, and affec-
tional modes and subject-matters of experience and the cognitional mode and 
its specific subject-matter” (Anton, 2005, p. 138). Studies marked the beginning 
of what Joseph Ratner, in 1939, referred to as Dewey’s recasting philosophy as 
a “general logic of experience” (Schilpp, 1951, p. 71). However, while Dewey 
made mention of a number of modes in that volume, he never offered a compre-
hensive list anywhere else in his writings.
 The absence of such a list should not lead one to read Dewey’s use of 
modes as an appeal to some nebulous, ineffable Absolute leading to a perverse 
“metaphysics of experience” (Cochran, 2010, p. 62). Rather, it should be seen as 
an initial exploration into a new conception of logic, the broad strokes of which 
needed to be worked out prior to the details. In fact, the majority of Dewey’s 
works between the 1903 Studies volume and his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 
could each be seen as working out the details of one of the fields of inquiry 
(ethics, art, religion, science, and politics) which arise out of the diverse modes 
of experience (the moral, aesthetic, religious, cognitive and social). “When we 
take Dewey’s works severally,” as Ratner put it:
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… [T]hey very naturally group themselves into special (or specific) logics of 
the typical (or distinctive) modes of experience. Thus to mention only some of 
his representative works: Human Nature and Conduct is the special logic of the 
socio-ethical mode of experience; Art as Experience is the special logic of the 
esthetic mode; A Common Faith—of the religious; …The Quest for Certainty 
and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry—comprise the special logic of the scientific 
mode of experience; The Public and It’s Problems, Individualism Old and New, 
Liberalism and Social Action—comprise the socio-practical or utilitarian; …And 
finally Experience and Nature. [Therein] All modes of experience are naturally 
interconnected, being socio-cultural differentiations of common experience. 
(Ratner and Altman, 1964, p. 71)
The influence Ratner’s reading has had on Dewey scholarship warrants lengthy 
quoting. However, the last remark of the passage—that, in Experience and Nature, 
the diverse modes of experience are naturally interconnected—is perhaps the most 
informative. As Ratner explained, the modes of experience are, for Dewey, differ-
entiations of a cultural sort, each of which imparts a specialized form of cultural 
“intelligence” interwoven into the fabric of common experience, and thus—nature. 
As Alexander and Eldridge have suggested, there seems to be a “guiding thought” 
in Dewey’s body of work; however, picking it out does not seem to be a matter of 
choosing between the “aesthetic dimension of experience” and “cultural instru-
mentalism” once knowledge as “seeing” is connected to knowledge as “doing.”
The “instrumental” features of knowledge
If Dewey’s work on the modes of experience is to be taken seriously, the 
immediacy of experience could be said to possess certain pre-cognitive elements, 
which are enriched through inquiry toward more robust cognitive states. This is 
probably what led to Dewey positing the concept of the “indeterminate situation” 
as “the antecedent condition” of inquiry. In his words, “Inquiry is the controlled 
or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so deter-
minate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of 
the original situation into a unified whole” (Dewey, 1938, p. 108). For Dewey, the 
organic interaction within an indeterminate situation will be transformed when:
… [E]xistential consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are 
examined with reference to their potentialities; and when responsive activities 
are selected and ordered with reference to actualization of some of the potenti-
alities, rather than others, in a final existential situation. (1938, p. 111)
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Where many have seen this aspect of Dewey’s work as a “life-long effort to 
practicalize intelligence,” he was adamant that his goal was rather to “intellec-
tualize practice” (Eldridge, 1998, p. 5). The former suggests intelligence must 
be made practical, while the latter implies experience is already inquiry-laden. 
Unsurprisingly, a straight line can be drawn from this mischaracterization to 
the type of charge leveled against Dewey’s thought, and pragmatism at large, as 
philosophical underwriting for crass opportunism.
 The difference between “intelligence practicalized” and “practice intellectu-
alized” could be framed as one between rudimentary and robust acts of inquiry. 
The downside to any rudimentary form of inquiry is that it yields a very narrow 
set of solutions. The traditions and techniques it produces will disclose only a 
limited number of possible solutions. Conversely, scientific inquiry, according 
to Dewey, can free meaning from the interests of a particular group and allow 
that meaning to become more abstract insofar as “semantic coherence, as such, 
is the controlling consideration” (1938, p. 119). What issues forth is a pattern 
of reasoning that guides inquiry vis-à-vis subsequent indeterminate situations. 
And, while this also amounts to a set of norms or imperatives, each is accepted 
or rejected only in terms of coherence with one another. This opens up the set 
of possible solutions to a problem by offering a logic of the situation.
 As such, Dewey’s Logic contained a marked difference in its treatment of 
the modes of experience. Dewey clearly had moved beyond discussing the 
various modes of experience and put forth arguments that were “intended to 
indicate that the different objectives of common sense and of scientific inquiry 
demand different subject-matters and that this difference in subject matters is 
not incompatible with the existence of a common pattern in both types” (1938, 
p. 119). In response to Ratner’s critique, Dewey commented, “Dr. Ratner has put 
his finger upon the main ‘shift’ in my writings …:”
… I should, from the start, have systematically distinguished between knowledge 
as the outcome of special inquiries (undertaken because of the presence of 
problems) and intelligence as the product and expression of cumulative funding 
of the meanings reached in these cases. (Schilpp, 1951, pp. 520–1)
Two points of clarification are needed. The first is that there is a salient 
difference between knowledge as the “outcome” and intelligence as the “habit” 
of the cognitive mode of experience, on one hand, and those outcomes 
and habits that are the byproducts of non-cognitive modes, on the other. 
When taken as a product of these latter, non-cognitive modes, knowledge 
is strictly passive and intelligence manifests itself as a supplicatory method 
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for dealing with problems. In other words, there are innumerable ways of 
coping with precariousness, few means for transforming it. The second point 
of clarification to be noted is that inquiry, understood in its broadest sense 
as enrichment within any of the modes of experience, may only provide 
the type of intelligence that allows for the accommodation or avoidance of 
adversity. Although Dewey believed that everyday inquiry is continuous 
with the more specialized, cognitive type of inquiry, he argued that only the 
virtues of the sort of intelligence, of which science was an example, could 
“give expertness of dealing with materials and tools, and promote the devel-
opment of the experimental habit of mind” (Dewey, 1920, p. 86).8 Rather than 
viewing Dewey’s distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive modes of 
experience as an indication of an underlying scientism, as many have, it again 
seems more appropriate to view it in terms of the difference between reflexive 
and non-reflexive actions identified in Greek organicism. Only the reflexivity 
of cognitive modes of experience can yield principles for further indeter-
minate situations as well as insights about the one doing the inquiring—thus 
uniting the Latin imperative, “Sapere aude,” with the Greek aphorism, “Gnothi 
seauton.”
 Conceptually, the “indeterminate situation” also reveals the incompleteness 
in any inquiry. According to Dewey, “Every such interaction is a temporal 
process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence;” that is to say, it is best 
characterized as a process (1938, p. 110). While rudimentary inquiry is a process 
of accommodation to meet demands of the environing conditions, cognitive 
inquiry is a process of adjustment in the situation, in both the environment 
and the organism. The result of which is an increase in complexity for both. As 
Dewey described it, “The temporal quality of inquiry means, then, something 
quite other than that the process of inquiry takes time. It means that the 
objective subject-matter of inquiry undergoes temporal modification” (1938, 
pp. 121–2). Twenty-two years earlier, in Democracy and Education, Dewey 
referred to this temporal modification as “plasticity,” and described it therein 
as “the capacity to retain and carry over from prior experience factors which 
modify subsequent activities” (1916, p. 47). In his later work, Dewey would 
refer to this as the capacity for “habit-formation.” As he put it in Experience and 
Nature:
… [A]n organism acts with reference to a time-spread, a serial order of 
events, as a unit, just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus an 
environment both extensive and enduring is immediately implicated in present 
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behavior. Operatively speaking, the remote and the past are “in” behavior 
making it what it is. (1925, p. 213)
Thus, any transformation of the indeterminate into the determinate is a process 
of once again returning to a “unified whole,” except that, qua the outcome of 
cognitive inquiry, the determinate situation is a context that has been enriched, 
i.e. it has gained structure, through a newly emergent habit. This is the major 
difference between habits as the outcome of cognitive inquiry and those of 
the non-cognitive experience. The habits which are employed in the former, 
which Dewey called intelligence, involve manipulation of abstract symbols, 
or meanings, whereas the latter involve the manipulation of values, which are 
always more proximate than meanings. In other words, cognitive habits form 
the principles of thought, on which fields like logic and mathematics are based. 
Non-cognitive habits form the principles of normativity, which form the subject 
matters of aesthetics and ethics. The former yields knowledge; the latter yields 
attitudes. But, for Dewey, all knowledge—even that which has been traditionally 
termed “propositional”—is essentially a skill, one acquired through developing 
appropriate habits. The consequence, then, is that even the semantic and logical 
rules that govern language are habitual.
The non-propositional elements of knowledge
Although both types of inquiry can lead to the formation of habits, only the 
cognitive variety can lead to the type of re-evaluation of its habits that Dewey 
referred to as “reconstruction.” Cognitive inquiry achieves this through the 
versatility of meaning. As Dewey put it, “the more numerous our habits the wider 
the field of possible observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the 
more refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presen-
tation evoked by imagination” (1922, p. 123). Because cognitive inquiry employs 
habits that deal with meaning, this type of inquiry can lead to the changing of 
those habits whenever they produce a solution that does not cohere with other 
meanings. This is where experimentation, which Dewey believed was merely a 
description of the default setting in which all “live creatures” operated, comes into 
focus within his account. As he had explained over a decade earlier, in his How 
We Think (1910), when any organism is presented with a series of events it will 
inevitably relate them to past experiences. Dewey claimed that the limitation of 
valuation within non-cognitive modes of experience is that it “affords no way of 
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discriminating between right and wrong conclusions” (1910, p. 294).9 Inquiries 
made from cognitive modes of experience, on the other hand, have an apparatus 
for distinguishing between competing theses. This apparatus is the habit of 
abstraction, or meaning manipulation. As Dewey put it, “Experiment is the chief 
resource in scientific reasoning because it facilitates the picking out of significant 
elements in a gross, vague whole” (1910, p. 298). He thought new interpretations 
arose through experimentation in response to particular problems. The difference, 
in the end, between cognitive inquiry and non-cognitive valuation boils down to 
the ability to create new habits via new interpretations of the meaning of action.
 All of this explains why Dewey became so concerned about precision of 
terminology in the field of epistemology, and why he eschewed that title for 
the field of knowledge acquisition as well. His work with Arthur Bentley in 
Knowing and the Known aimed to “fix a set of leading words capable of firm 
use in the discussion of “knowings” and “existings” in that specialized region 
of research called the theory of knowledge” (1949, p. xi). The collected essays 
of which Knowing was comprised originally appeared between 1944 and 1949 
and were the result of a rich correspondence which began in November of 1932 
and continued until the winter of 1951, when Dewey had become too weak to 
maintain it. The collected correspondence, edited by Sidney Ratner and Jules 
Altman and published in 1964 by Rutgers University Press, shows itself to be 
a worthwhile study as a proving-ground for a terminology they hoped would 
clarify key concepts in Dewey’s Logic. Though many terms traditionally used by 
Dewey were dropped for the publication of Knowing (for example, “experience,” 
“interaction,” and “knowledge”), one of the main holdovers was “inquiry,” 
indicating how much of the theoretical structure of their collaboration owed to 
Dewey’s view (Ratner and Altman, 1964, pp. 44–5).
 Also retained in Knowing and the Known was Dewey’s notion of “situation,” 
now tied to more deeply to “events,” “occurrences,” and “objects.” As they wrote:
When an event is of the type that is readily observable in transition within the 
ordinary spans of human discrimination… we shall call it occurrence… Object 
is chosen as the clearly indicated name for stabilized, enduring situations 
… Thus, any one of the three words Situation, Occurrence and Object may, 
if focusing of attention shifts, spread over the range of the others. All being 
equally held as Event. (Dewey and Bentley, 1949, p. 70)
Although most naturalists of Dewey’s era rejected substance ontology and the 
Cartesian assumptions drawn from it, what made Dewey unique among them 
was how he rejected it. As he put it:
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… [W]hat we call matter is that character of natural events which is so tied up 
with changes that are sufficiently rapid to be perceptible as to give the latter 
a characteristic rhythmic order, the causal sequence. It is no cause or source 
of events or processes; no absolute monarch; no principle of explanation; no 
substance behind or underlying changes—save in that sense of substance in 
which a man well fortified with this world’s goods, and hence able to maintain 
himself through vicissitudes of surroundings, is a man of substance. The name 
designates a character in operation, not an entity. (1925, p. 65)
While “characterization” takes on an important role in Knowing and the Known, 
one has to turn to the Dewey–Bentley correspondence to grasp what he meant 
by the “character” of “events.” In a letter dated December 4, 1945, Dewey 
wrote to Bentley that in the Logic he “had need to distinguish the concrete and 
abstract from the standpoint of logical use in inquiry,” and “As I used ‘character,’ 
it is a synonym … [for] an ‘abstract’ noun” (Ratner and Altman, 1964, p. 
499). Reading this and surrounding correspondence against an essay Dewey 
published in the Journal of Philosophy that same month, titled “Ethical Subject 
Matter and Language” (1945), suggests that Dewey felt this use of “character” 
was all of a piece with its use in his moral writings. This also links up with the 
abandonment, in Knowing and the Known, of the separate terms “experience” 
and “knowledge” in favor of a single term—“knowing-known”—to cover both, 
as well as the choice to drop “individual” in favor of “organism.” Under this 
more precise terminology, Dewey and Bentley hoped to make clear that human 
beings themselves were also events.
 Just as Darwin had shown that a species was not a static eidos, pre-ordained 
by some unmoved mover, Dewey sought to prove that what we take to be 
individual objects are actually confluences of significance, and what we take to 
be an individual intelligence is merely a concrescence of habit—both cultural 
and experiential. In this way, reason is not something over and above nature, 
but is immersed within it as a part of cultural experience. He wrote:
… [R]eason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science, 
and used in the creation of social arts; it has something to do. It liberates man 
from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into 
custom. It projects a better future and assists man in its realization. And its 
operation is always subject to test in experience. (Dewey, 1920, p. 135)
Instead of positing reason as the tenant of a reified mind, as naturalists like 
Santayana seemed to do, Dewey argued that the intellect was a function that 
emerged from the transaction of experiencing events (or “organisms”) from 
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within the context of other events surrounding them (or “environment”) toward 
working out unstable situations—it was, in a word, a habitual.
Knowledge, praxis, cosmos—habit and growth
“Habit” is another term that appears in the Dewey–Bentley correspondence, 
but not in their finished manuscript of Knowing and the Known. This seems 
to be Bentley’s influence. Dewey, looking for a substitute for “conception,” 
wrote on July 2, 1945: “There are attitudes, dispositions, habits, which operate 
continuously and for the most part steadily and stably. (‘Habits’ is perhaps the 
best word because it is a transactional word. … Attitudes being always toward, 
and dispositions, arrangements, of something)” (Ratner and Altman, 1964, p. 
436). Bentley’s response to Dewey, however, made it clear he thought habit to 
cover only some of the instances in which “conception” might be used, and 
misused, and so it was not replaced. Later, however, Dewey and Bentley agreed 
“100%,” as Dewey wrote, that habit was a not merely something possessed by 
an organism, but was instead in the entire situation, it was, as they called it a 
“habit-transactional” (Ratner and Altman, 1964, p. 496). More will need to be 
said about transactions below, but first more must be said about how Dewey 
viewed habits as encompassing both moral character and the character of 
situations.
 For Dewey, habits were intimately connected to his conception of “growth,” 
which also held special meaning in his work. In his words:
Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and persistent balance 
of organic activities with the surroundings, and of active capacities to readjust 
activity to meet new conditions. The former furnishes the background of 
growth; the latter constitute growth. (1916, p. 57)
A general definition of growth in this sense can be found earlier in Democracy 
and Education, where Dewey called growth the “cumulative movement of action 
toward a later result” (1916, p. 46). This definition, however, is perhaps too 
vague. Dewey probably did not mean to reinstate what he saw as “a false idea 
of growth or development,—that it is a movement toward a fixed goal,” so some 
unpacking is required (1916, p. 55). Dewey’s own explication is only marginally 
helpful: “Growth is [mistakenly] regarded as having an end, instead of being 
an end;” it “has no end beyond itself ” (1916, pp. 55–7). Even among Dewey’s 
proponents, this has been found problematic:
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Dewey’s claims about “growth” … must, therefore, be understood carefully, 
if not jettisoned outright. An emphasis on growth must be complemented 
by the articulation of aims more consistent with a particular view of human 
flourishing … It was a wonderful chainsaw for clearing the forest of antiquated 
trees. But, like most chainsaws, it’s not very helpful for planting and cultivating. 
(Boisvert, 2002)
Granted, the efforts Dewey made to identify the “conditions of growth” 
throughout Democracy and Education and Human Nature and Conduct do 
not, by themselves, fully establish growth as a building block for a full-fledged 
moral philosophy; yet, when the concept is considered in juxtaposition with the 
features of Greek organicism already outlined, its subtle upshots become more 
apparent.
 Dewey believed a better understanding of “immaturity,” which for him 
included the notions of capacity and potentiality, would help clarify his view:
Capacity may denote mere receptivity, like the capacity of a quart measure. We 
may mean by potentiality a merely dormant or quiescent state—a capacity to 
become something different under external influences. But we also mean by 
capacity an ability, a power; and by potentiality potency, force. Now when we 
say that immaturity means the possibility of growth, we are not referring to 
absence of powers which may exist at a later time; we express a force positively 
present—the ability to develop. (1916, p. 46)10
Achieving a new “power” of interaction with the environment through the 
reconstruction of habit is best understood as a pause, not a break in the process 
of growth. This is the point that Dewey later developed in his 1932 revision 
of the Ethics text, where he wrote, “It is in the quality of becoming that virtue 
resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. 
To make an end a final goal is but to arrest growth” (1932, p. 306).
 With these statements, Dewey wanted to show that character (his expression 
for abstract tendencies to act, or “principles”) and conduct (actual acts) are not 
only inseparable, because they are different sides of habit formation, but also 
that the habits produced by inquiries within the cognitive modes of experience 
provide freedom to individuals insofar as they open up the possibility for new 
interpretations, whereas habits formed through repetition, i.e. tradition, restrict 
freedom, and often become our masters by restricting the growth of recon-
struction (Dewey, 1922, chapters 2–3). Growth, as Dewey saw it, is naturalistic 
insofar as it eradicates the supposed ontological distinction between abstract 
“Reason” on the one hand and immediate experience on the other that has 
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colored most of philosophy since the enlightenment. According to Dewey, 
inquiry, and ipso facto the growth that arises out of it, always already takes place 
in the having of an experience. If Dewey’s theory had stopped there, it would be 
quite similar to other naturalists of his day; however, the above evidence seems 
to suggest his view of growth was also ontological. For instance, in the third 
chapter of Knowing and the Known, Dewey and Bentley offer the following:
A. Postulations for Behavioral Research
1. The cosmos: as system or field of factual inquiry.
2. Organisms: as cosmic components
3. Men: as organisms.
4. Behavings of men: as organic-environmental events.
5.  Knowings (including the knowings of the cosmos and its postulation): as 
such organic-environmental behavings. (1949, p. 84)
With a theory of inquiry so outside of the mainstream, it should not be surprising 
that Dewey’s view received more than its fair share of critics.11 Richard Gale, for 
one, has characterized Dewey’s view as a Promethean mysticism:
The metaphysics of Experience and Nature, far from being an empirically 
based description of the generic traits of existence, can best be understood as 
a transcendental deduction argument for what nature must be like if it is to be 
possible for inquiry to take place in it, and this results in an anthropomorphic 
metaphysics that ensures the world will be a fit place for Promethean endeavor 
to control nature through inquiry. (Cochran, 2010, p. 57)
Gale identifies three “underlying doctrines” within Dewey’s naturalism that 
typify metaphysical speculation insofar as they “do not admit of any objective 
verification” (Cochran, 2010, p. 75). The first is what he calls Dewey’s “Humpty 
Dumptyism,” which stems from the Deweyan worry that “if we ever let [reality] 
fall apart into numerically distinct pieces, not all the king’s philosophers can put 
it back together again into relational complexes” (Cochran, 2010, p. 60). Next 
is what Gale designates as Dewey’s “organism,” which he attributes to Dewey’s 
early Hegelianism and affinity for the Romantic poets. Gale points to Dewey’s 
notion of mutual dependency, such as the one between lungs and air, as a 
hallmark example of his tendency to overblow the role of organisms:
Dewey’s claim of a mutual dependency between lungs and air, and, more 
generally, between an organism and its natural environment, is dubious, for the 
air can exist without there being lungs to breathe it and a natural environment 
can survive the demise of all organisms. (Cochran, 2010, p. 65)
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Last, Gale holds up Dewey’s reliance on the notion of “continuity” as the third 
pillar of his mystical metaphysics. Because Dewey was so adamantly against 
reductive approaches in the sciences and philosophy, Gale concludes that what 
Dewey meant by “continuity” must have been of a top-down variety, tanta-
mount to panpsychism.
 These criticisms may appear, at first blush, quite damaging to Dewey’s 
position—particularly when considering it in connection with Greek organ-
icism. However, there seems to be something incredible in each of the supposed 
“mystical” doctrines Gale has put forth. First, while Dewey would have assented 
to the notion that reality could fall into “numerically distinct pieces,” he would 
have seen any such distinction as just a matter of a “selective emphasis.” 
Furthermore, just as respiration transforms the object of air chemically, physi-
cally, and volumetrically, so an organism transforms its environment. That 
the natural environment would survive the demise of all organisms (albeit in 
a significantly diminished capacity), or the existence of air would continue 
without lungs, does not negate that the changes made by these respective 
involvements is not constitutive. Finally, to suggest that any notion of conti-
nuity must conform either to reductionism or panpsychism seems a completely 
wrongheaded false dichotomy.
Transaction and non-linear growth
What Gale’s reading of Dewey fails to fully consider is the centrality of trans-
action in Knowing and the Known. In the fourth chapter, Dewey and Bentley 
introduce the term:
… [L]et us now set down in broad outlines three levels of the organization and 
presentation of inquiry in the order of their historical appearance … Self-action: 
where things are viewed as acting under their own powers. Inter-action: where 
thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection. Transaction: where 
systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and 
phases of action, without final attribution to “elements” or other presump-
tively detachable or independent “entities,” “essences,” or “realities,” and 
without isolation of presumptively detachable “relations” from such detachable 
“elements.” (1949, pp. 107–8)
In accounting for the development of these levels of inquiry, the origins of 
self-action are located within the proto-scientific theories of ancient cultures, 
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interaction in the mechanistic theories of Galileo and Newton, and transaction 
in the relational perspectives opened up by quantum and magnetic field research. 
In the notes to this passage, it is explained that “Dewey’s early employment of the 
word ‘transaction’ was to stress system more emphatically than could be done by 
‘interaction,’” and is compared with his use of “integration” in the Logic and is an 
extension of the position taken in “The Reflex Arc” (Dewey and Bentley, 1949, 
p. 116, n. 8). Dewey and Bentley were explicit that each of these three levels 
remains available in any inquiry, which connects up nicely with Dewey’s earlier 
claims about the modes of experience and the incompleteness of Greek organ-
icism. Gale’s criticism seems to stem from an interactional viewpoint, however, 
which turns on linear notions of causality, progress, and growth. What is meant 
by “linear” refers to those systems or processes which follow an analog series 
of steps aimed at a particular goal, clearly defined antecedently to action—what 
Dewey often called final ends, in a disapproving tone. In linear frameworks, 
causal arrows (and ipso facto progress) point in a singular direction.
 As shown, Dewey believed that growth was an inevitable aspect of life, one 
that could be either nourished and directed, or untended and chaotic. The 
latter form often stems from a classically liberal, laissez-faire approach that 
extends from the interactional perspective, one which can lead to overgrowth 
and morbidity. Dewey rejected this approach and instead sought a growing 
together of individuals within a community that resulted in what he called social 
intelligence. This holds interesting implications for both Dewey’s philosophy 
of education and his political philosophy. James Scott Johnston nicely sums up 
the connection between Dewey’s theory of inquiry, growth, and his views on 
education:
To construct meaningful facts about the world is to expand the fund of meaning 
one has. To expand the fund of meaning one has is to enrich present and future 
experiences. Inquiry is the primary means by which growth is occasioned, and 
inquiry is a habit that is (and must be) developed, brought to bear on environ-
mental and social situations. To develop this habit is precisely what is meant by 
education. (Johnston, 2006b, p. 111)
For Dewey, education fails when it seeks only to foster the growth of the 
individual and not the public, or situation, at large. In this way, it seeks a 
singular, final end, and is, therefore, linear in its practice.
 By contrast, the educational practice Dewey sought to develop was a 
“non-linear” process meant to increase experiential complexity (in the sense of 
richness) through a chorus of interrelated events and feedback loops. Nonlinear 
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education comes not from some teleological design prior to action, but rather 
emerges through action. As such, causal arrows (and progress) simultaneously 
point in multiple directions, toward what Dewey called ends-in-view. The 
difference between linear and non-linear conceptions of growth is equivalent 
to the difference between the progress made when traveling toward a set desti-
nation and the general progress one makes when fitness training. Only in the 
former type of activity is growth measured according to a quantifiable telos. 
Yet, when a new indeterminate situation arises, those who have experienced 
non-linear growth, instead, will be able to adapt to the changes in the situation 
like a healthy organism can adjust to changes in its environment or a skilled jazz 
musicians can improvise around the notes she hears.
 There is ample evidence from Dewey’s life and work to suggest that non-linear 
growth was the primary value in his socio-political thinking, as well, one he 
called both the means and “the only end” from which he believed a better 
future could emerge through the process he called “creative democracy.” 
Far from naively espousing this ideal, however, Dewey took growth to be 
an arduous and daunting task, but one that was nevertheless indispensable 
to progress. What sets Dewey’s advocacy for public adaptability apart from 
other philosophies of social progress is its circumvention of Thomistic notions 
of Aristotelian teleology, which was a key maneuver in his philosophical 
naturalism, as well. Just as Dewey’s naturalism adopted non-linear depic-
tions of nature as an “environing field” and of human psychology as a matrix 
of “sensori-motor coordination,” so too was the view of social progress he 
adopted non-linear; it did not hang on the kind of final, utopian political end 
espoused by many others. The distrust of democracy held by Greek thinkers 
like Plato and Aristotle was likely rooted in problems similar to those faced 
by our American democracy—successful democratic constitutions require 
citizens to have rich repertoires of cultural experience, critical apparatuses 
finely tuned to subtle political nuances, and the intellectual maturity to not 
be threatened by alternative points of view—while at the same time requiring 
a process sufficiently streamlined to address public needs with efficiency and 
timeliness. Simply put, “democracy is too simple for complex societies and 
too complex for simple ones” (Benhabib, 1996, p. 42). Dewey would couch the 
problem in this way: social intelligence is a property of publics, not individuals; 
yet, democratic institutions are aimed solely at the education of individuals 
and not publics. This mismatch is why democracies often fail and why Dewey 
spent so much of his time championing “creative democracy” as a “way of life,” 
instead of merely a mode of governance. The difference hangs on learning “to 
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treat those who disagree—even profoundly—with us, as those from whom we 
may learn” (Dewey, 1939, p. 228). This resonates deeply with one of the most 
enduring aspects of Greek philosophy—a pursuit of wisdom that started with 
the problems and powers of humankind, and placed these in dialogue with the 
surrounding world.
 Yet, to show how the preceding ideas jibe with the most salient features of 
Greek organicism, and why I believe Dewey sought to capture its general spirit, 
it may be best to allow him to speak for himself. In an encyclopedia entry titled 
“Humanism and Naturalism,” one of several contributions to A Cyclopedia of 
Education (1912–13), Dewey wrote:
Greek classic philosophy presents, upon the whole, a view of things in which 
there is a balance between naturalism and humanism … classic Greek idealism 
was idealistic in the sense that it had a teleological view of nature. Nature and 
mind were not regarded as two forces working either together or against each 
other, but as means and end, causal conditions and final values, potentiality and 
actuality. (pp. 214–15)
This article, written only three years before Dewey disclosed his interest in 
Greek philosophy to his graduate students at Columbia, shows what he hoped 
to revive. It continues:
… [F]ound in the revival of Greek philosophic thought [is] a means of justi-
fying the growing interest in the phenomena of physical and  human nature 
… The prevailing way of conceiving the relation of man and nature was that 
of a microcosm to a macrocosm. Man was in small edition that which the 
universe was in large. This union, resting upon the use of Greek thought and 
the emulation of the free Greek spirit to justify a free and full satisfaction of 
human capacity through natural conditions, was, however, soon undermined 
from both sides. (pp. 215–16)
Perhaps these statements will lead scholars to look more closely at what Dewey 
found inspiring in Greek philosophy. As he concludes:
… [C]ontemporary philosophy and contemporary educational theory may be 
said to be confronted with a common problem: The discovery of the common 
background or matrix in which humanistic and naturalistic interests are united; 
and the tracing of their respective differentiations from this community of 
origin—a differentiation, however, which should not become a separation, and 
which, accordingly, secures the possibility of fruitful interaction between them 
whenever desired. (p. 217)
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Notes
 1 At first glance, such a concept may appear to correspond completely with a 
contemporary “physical” understanding of nature, and it is often translated as such. 
Yet, the connotation of this term, “organic growth,” stands in sharp contrast with 
the modern conception of nature built on the Latin equivalent natura, indicating 
“birth,” and handed down to history by figures like Descartes and Newton.
 2 According to John MacPartland, Aristotle “speaks of knowledge as a ‘vision,’ ‘view,’ 
or ‘seeing.’ He knows very well that a misconception might easily arise here, and 
that is why he customarily says that knowledge is an immaterial act, but we do 
not see the immaterial, hence we have to take our terms from the material acts we 
see going on around us and use them analogically to describe immaterial activity. 
Thus the terms ‘vision,’ ‘view,’ or ‘seeing’ mean to view from without when they 
describe the way the eye sees its object, or the way a spectator views a spectacle. 
But when they describe the manner of seeing of the knower, that is, when they 
describe an immaterial act, they still mean a ‘vision,’ ‘view,’ or ‘seeing,’ but from 
within. This follows from the fact that the knower is the other, intentionally or 
immaterially, hence his view of reality is from within. In like manner, by contrast 
with the passive view of the spectator, who is external to the object, the view of the 
knower is vital, because he ‘lives the life of the other.’ ” (MacPartland, 1945, p. 292)
 3 Havelock continues, “The pioneers preferred to adapt old terms, rather than 
invent new ones. Noein, to be aware or sensible of, phronein, to have wits, 
logizesthai, to tally, skopein to look at, epistasthai, to get on top of (in mastering 
a skill) were converted to the senses of thinking, reasoning, analyzing, 
understanding scientifically, and the corresponding nouns, phronesis, episteme, 
nous, dianoia (thought, science, mind, intellect) began to turn into indexes of 
sheer thought and abstract intellection” (Havelock, 1984, p. 81). See also Joanne 
Waugh’s reference to this shift in “Neither Published nor Perished: The Dialogues 
as Speech, not Text” (1995).
 4 For instance, Robert Scharff has suggested that the Socratic paradox might be 
resolved by thinking of these claims of ignorance and his apparent wisdom as 
involving some sort of “vital understanding,” or what Heidegger called verstehen 
(Scharff, 1986).
 5 Trendelenburg synthesized these two ideas into what he called “constructive 
motion” which he saw as the common trait between thought and being. On one 
hand, thought moves from potentiality to actuality, per Aristotle, as it becomes 
the object that is thought, on the other hand, being moves from potentiality to 
actuality, per Darwin, through natural selection. For a more detailed description 
of Trendelenburg’s “constructive motion,” see Raymond Boisvert’s Dewey’s 
Metaphysics (1988, pp. 22–4).
 6 In her autobiographical account of her work at Hull House, Addams writes 
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of organizing Hellenic festivals, where classical philosophers and playwrights 
would be read and discussed (Addams, 1910). Renewed scholarly interest in 
Mead has revealed a deeper interest in the development of classical philosophy 
than previously realized. In fact, it seems that he was working, during the 1890s 
when he and Dewey were colleagues, on a book-length manuscript regarding the 
“origins of Greek speculation.”
 7 In 1944, Columbia University Press published a collection of essays edited by 
Yervant Krikorian under the title, Naturalism and the Human Spirit. Most of the 
contributors in that volume were associated with the department of philosophy at 
Columbia. It represented the culmination of nearly 40 years of work at Columbia 
and was a clear expression of their brand of naturalistic philosophy.
 8 This has led to many of Dewey’s critics, and some of his admirers, to the mistaken 
conclusion that the aim of his theory of inquiry was to give a complete logic of 
science in a vein similar to that of the positivists. However, he admitted in the 
preface of Logic that this account “does not have and could not have the finish and 
completeness that are theoretically possible” (1938, p. 5). Yet, he was convinced 
that it was “so thoroughly sound” that anyone who entertained it would “develop a 
theory of logic that is in thorough accord with all the best authenticated methods 
of attaining knowledge” (p. 5).
 9 Thus, by itself, the kinds of rudimentary inquiry which extend out from 
non-cognitive experience, namely “valuations,” do not provide the habits of 
deciding between simple conclusions such as “phlogiston” or “opium’s dormative 
powers” against more complex explanations such as “combining oxygen with a 
combustible” or “a chemical reaction in the brain.”
10 Although growth involves the transformation of the indeterminate to the 
determinate, this should not suggest once this transformation has taken place that 
growth has ended. This is why Dewey repeatedly warned against interpreting his 
“consummatory” experience as a break in the continuity of experience.
11 There is not room here for a proper treatment of the many criticisms Dewey’s 
theory of inquiry has received since its inception. For such an account, one should 
turn to James Scott Johnston’s Inquiry and Education: John Dewey and the Quest 
for Democracy (2006b). Though his interest in Deweyan inquiry is mainly in the 
realm of philosophy of education, his second chapter gives an excellent overview 
of the historic and present-day debates surrounding inquiry.
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